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Abstract
We construct a dynamic model of university research that allows
us to examine recent concerns that ﬁnancial incentives associated with
university patent licensing are detrimental to the traditional mission
of US research universities. We assume a principal-agent framework
in which the university administration is the principal and a faculty
researcher is the agent. Whether or not the researcher remains in the
university, and if so her choice of the amount of time to spend on basic
and applied research, is complicated by the fact that she earns license
income and prestige both inside and outside the university. Thus in
contrast to usual principal agent models the participation constraint
is endogenous. This, plus the fact that current research aﬀects future
knowledge stocks, allows us to show that it is far from obvious that
licensing will damage basic research and education.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A sequence of related policy changes in the 1980’s increased both the ability
and incentive for U.S. universities to patent and license the results of faculty
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1research. The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 gave universities the right to own,
patent, and license results of federally-funded research, and the Supreme
Court approved patentability of genetically engineered bacteria and soft-
ware, thereby expanding patentability of inventions in biological and com-
puter sciences.1 Since then there has been a dramatic increase in patent
activity in U.S. universities. For example, the 86 universities responding
to the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) Survey in
1991 and 1998 reported an increase in patent applications of 176 percent and
licenses executed of 131 percent. While university administrators cite such
ﬁgures as evidence of the increasing role of universities in economic devel-
opment, others see the dramatic increase in patent licensing as problematic,
potentially compromising the traditional role of universities in research and
education.2
Two issues of concern are the nature of faculty research and the way
results are disseminated. The conventional wisdom is that faculty have
both a comparative advantage and a taste for basic research. Publication of
this research creates a nonexcludable public good which serves as a basis for
further research in industry as well as academia. Thus to the extent that
faculty receive license income from patentable research, the concern is that
they will be diverted from basic research and/or limit the dissemination of
their work, putting both current and future innovation at risk (Griliches
1988, Osano 1992).
Those concerned about the impact on education raise several issues.
While they recognize that faculty involvement in patent licensing has the
potential to improve curricula, they express concern that faculty may spend
less time in education as they pursue entrepreneurial activities associated
with licensing. Critics, in fact, worry that university administrators may
encourage such activity in the interest of capturing license income.3 The
1Other patent reforms in the 1980s, such as the creation of the Federal Circuit Court
and the lengthening of patent life for pharmaceuticals, also strengthened patent protection
for businesses as well as universities. Here we focus on those changes that were particularly
relevant for university inventions. See Gallini (2002) for a discussion of the implications
of these reforms for businesses.
2These issues are suﬃciently controversial to be the subject of a recent cover story of
Atlantic Monthly titled “The Kept University” (Press and Washburn 2000). Moreover,
Congress, the Science, Technology and Economics Policy (STEP) board of the National
Research Council, and the President’s Commission on Science and Technology have all
undertaken review of university patenting.in the context of Bayh-Dole.
3Cash constrained universities in the United Kingdom explicitly encourage faculty to
engage in income generating activities, such as applied research and/or consultancy, and
tax the resulting income to increase university resources (see Beath et al. 2003).
2most serious concern, however, is that the patent process may prevent or
delay the use of research results in the lab or classroom, diminishing the
quality of education (Stephan 2001, and Stephan and Levin 1996).
Amid the rhetoric there is little formal analysis of these issues. While
recent empirical research provides some evidence that applied research has
increased (Cohen et al. 1994, Lach and Schankerman 2002, Morgan et al.
1997, Rahm 1994), others show little change over the last two decades in
the ratio of applied to basic research (Thursby and Thursby 2004). And
although there is some research on the eﬀects of ﬁnancial incentives on the
allocation of time between applied and basic research (Beath et al. 2003 and
Jensen and Thursby 2001), there is none on the corresponding eﬀects on the
future stocks of scientiﬁc and patentable knowledge and on the quality of
education.
We therefore construct a dynamic model of a research university that
allows us to examine these issues. The university produces scientiﬁck n o w l -
edge, patentable knowledge, and education of variable quality using a re-
searcher, a faculty member whose current research choices aﬀect educational
quality and future knowledge stocks. Our intent is to analyze the eﬀects of
these recent policy changes on the allocation of time between basic and
applied research, and thus on the stocks of knowledge and the quality of ed-
ucation. The stock of scientiﬁc knowledge earns prestige for the researcher
and the administration, while the stock of patentable knowledge earns li-
cense income as well as prestige. We assume a principal-agent relationship
in which the university is the principal. The administration chooses her
salary and teaching load, taking into account her productivity in research
and education and the resulting income from licensing and tuition. If the
researcher works for the university, she allocates her time between teaching
and two types of research, basic and applied. Prestige and income provide
utility for both the researcher and administration. The researcher, however,
also receives utility simply from the time spent on each type of research.
Administration income also depends on the quality of education, which in
turn depends on the research output that is available for use in the classroom
and the time the faculty spends on education. While the stock of scientiﬁc
knowledge is freely available for use in education, we assume only a portion
of the stock of patentable knowledge can be used prior to actual patenting.
This allows us to examine the concern that patenting compromises the qual-
ity of education by limiting the dissemination of knowledge. It should be
noted that because the researcher retains her share of license income and
the knowledge stocks if she leaves the university, her reservation utility is
not exogenously ﬁxed as in usual principal-agent models, but instead is a
3function of both her share and the knowledge stocks.
Whether the researcher specializes in basic or applied research, or spends
some time on each, in any period depends on the marginal rate of substi-
tution of applied for basic research. In a static problem, this merely takes
into account the utility associated with each type of research. However, in
a dynamic environment, this marginal rate of substitution also incorporates
the productivity of this research in adding to future knowledge stocks, and
so to income and prestige. Although it seems likely that an increase in in-
come associated with patent licensing would induce her to reallocate time to
applied research, this is not necessary. This reallocation should increase the
future stock of patentable knowledge she produces, but it should also reduce
the future stock of scientiﬁc knowledge and its associated prestige, and it
could also reduce her utility from research per se. In fact, it is not clear that
this reallocation would increase the stock of patentable knowledge for faculty
whose basic research yields both patentable and scientiﬁck n o w l e d g e( i . e . ,
those whose work falls in the much publicized Pasteur’s Quadrant (Stokes
1997)). In an interior solution for any period, an increase in her teaching
load decreases the time she devotes to both basic and applied research. A
change in her salary, her share of license income, and either current stock of
knowledge results in a reallocation of time to applied research if and only if
this change increases the marginal rate of substitution of applied for basic
research.
In each period, the equilibrium salary and teaching load are set so that
her participation constraint binds and the administration’s willingness to
pay her to teach an additional hour equals her marginal rate of substitu-
tion between research and income. Her participation constraint is positively
sloped, so she must be paid a higher salary to carry a greater teaching load.
Although we focus on interior solutions, one corner solution is noteworthy.
It may be optimal for the administration to allow star scientists to specialize
completely in research. In this case, oﬀering them a higher salary to induce
them to teach more reduces their production of both knowledge stocks and
thus may lower the quality of education and reduce tuition revenue.
Comparative statics reveal that the equilibrium teaching load and salary
chosen by the administration in any period may or may not change in re-
sponse to a change in the researcher’s share of license income. If preferences
are homothetic, we show that the researcher’s share of license income has no
eﬀect on her teaching load, and thus no eﬀect on her allocation of time be-
t w e e nb a s i ca n da p p l i e dr e s e a r c h .I ngeneral, if a change in her share aﬀects
her utility within the university the same as her reservation utility, which is
likely as she can continue to earn license income after she exits, then there
4is no change in her participation constraint. In this case, the change in her
share either has no eﬀect on the optimal teaching load or her salary (as in
the case of homothetic preferences), or causes them to move in the same
direction. Note, however, that a change in the teaching load does not af-
fect the researcher’s allocation of time between basic and applied research
unless it changes the marginal rate of substitution between the two types of
research.
We also examine the eﬀect of changes in the researcher’s current stocks
of scientiﬁc and patentable knowledge on the equilibrium teaching load and
salary. If the prestige associated with scientiﬁc knowledge is greater within
the university, then an increase in its current stock typically decreases the
salary and increases the teaching load, but in general cannot both increase
the salary and decrease the teaching load. If the prestige associated with
patentable knowledge is greater outside the university, then an increase in its
current stock typically increases the salary and decreases the teaching load,
but in general cannot both decrease the salary and increase the teaching
load. Because the researcher’s utility does not depend on the portion of
patentable knowledge that can be disseminated in education, a change in
this portion has no eﬀect on her participation constraint. Thus a decrease
in this portion either has no eﬀect on the teaching load or her salary (as for
homothetic preferences), or causes them to move in the same direction.
We assume the quality of education is increasing in the teaching load
and the knowledge stocks used in education. The eﬀects of these policy
changes on equilibrium educational quality are not obvious. For example,
if an increase in the share has no eﬀect on the current teaching load, then
it has no eﬀect on the current or future quality of education. However,
if an increase in the share decreases the current teaching load, then the
current quality of education declines. The reduction in the current teaching
load increases current research and therefore the future knowledge stocks.
The eﬀects of these changes on the future choices of both the researcher and
administration, and therefore the future quality of education, are ambiguous.
Analogously, a decrease in the portion of patentable knowledge that can be
disseminated generally has ambiguous eﬀects.
Thus, to the extent that the court’s extension of patent protection to
research in biological and computer sciences increased opportunities for fac-
ulty outside the university, it could have led to increased university salaries
and lower teaching loads. Bayh-Dole would have reinforced this eﬀect as
administrators would be willing to pay more for less time spent in education
because they could substitute license income for tuition. It is nonetheless
important to observe that this need not have led to a decrease in the quality
5of education. The increase in patentable knowledge would tend to increase
the quality of education, ceteris paribus. There is evidence, however, of
communication restrictions associated with commercialization which could
have resulted in a decrease in the amount of this knowledge actually used in
education. Blumenthal et al. (1997) and Louis et al. (2001) ﬁnd that faculty
in the life sciences who are involved with commercialization are more likely
to withhold information from colleagues than other faculty. In Thursby
and Thursby’s (2002) survey of businesses who license from universities, 50
percent of the respondents reported that their contracts speciﬁed delays of
publication and rights to delete information. To the extent that this is the
case, our results show that the critics have legitimate concerns because the
university administration’s incentive to reduce teaching loads would have
to be oﬀset by increases in the amount of patentable knowledge used in
education in order to avoid a decrease in the quality of education.
These results contribute to the growing literature on university patent-
ing, which with few exceptions has abstracted from the implications for basic
research and education.4 Much of the literature focuses on the role of patent
citations and patent licensing in the transfer of research to industry (see, for
example, Henderson et al. 1998, Jaﬀe et al. 1993, Jensen and Thursby 2001,
Mowery et al. 2001 a, b). Thursby and Thursby (2002) provide evidence to
support the view that entrepreneurial university administrations and faculty
research orientation have both been factors in increased university patent-
ing, but they do not address issues related to education. With the exception
of recent work by Beath et al. (2003), studies of the tension between ba-
sic and applied research have focused on the behavior of proﬁt-maximizing
ﬁrms (Osano 1992, Cockburn, Henderson, and Stern 1999, and Stern 2004).
Beath et al. (2003) show that universities may want to allow faculty to con-
duct applied research on a consulting basis in order to ease the university’s
budget constraint, however, they do not examine the implications of such
work for the quality of university education.
Our results also contribute to the literature on teaching, research, and
educational quality. Recent work by del Ray (2001) examines how diﬀerent
4The related literature on university-industry collaboration has examined the eﬀects
on research, but not education. Cohen et.al (1998) provide a useful review. Cohen et.al’s
(1994) survey of university-industry research centers (UIRCs) provides evidence of the
countervailing eﬀects of industry collaboration on faculty productivity, with so-called com-
mercial outputs of research increasing and publications decreasing (except in biotechnol-
ogy). On the other hand, Mansﬁeld’s (1995) study of 321 academic researchers shows a
complementarity between consulting and basic research. Similarly, Zucker et. al.(1994,
1998) found that the most productive scientists in biotechnology tend to capitalize on
commercial applications of their basic research.
6schemes for ﬁnancing undergraduate education aﬀect the quality of educa-
tion. In this, as well as earlier work (see Barooah 1991), the quality of
education is determined by the quality of students admitted and the re-
sources devoted to teaching. By contrast, we model quality as a function of
the knowledge that can be shared in the classroom as well as the amount of
time devoted to teaching.
2 A Model of The Research University
We consider a research university that produces three outputs in each period
t: scientiﬁck n o w l e d g ekt; patentable knowledge pt; and education of quality
qt. Production of each output requires use of a university researcher, F,
who is a member of the faculty. The researcher’s career begins at t =1and
ends at t =2 . In each period, she can work for the university or exit to
her next best alternative. That is, we assume a principal-agent relationship
with the university as the principal and the researcher as the agent. If she
works for the university, she allocates her time between teaching and the two
types of research. We normalize time available in each period t so that at is
the fraction of time devoted to applied research in the university, bt is the
fraction of time devoted to basic research, and et =1−at−bt is the fraction
of time spent in teaching at t. As is standard in science and engineering
departments, the teaching load is deﬁned by total student contact hours,
which includes activities such as advising dissertations or lab research as
well as classroom instruction. If she exits, then she receives her reservation
utility. Unlike usual principal-agent models, however, her reservation utility
is not an exogenously ﬁxed value, because there are alternatives in which
she can continue her basic and/or applied research, such as move to another
university or a ﬁrm in the private sector, or establish a start-up ﬁrm. Her
reservation utility must be a function of the knowledge she takes with her.
2.1 Preferences
Researchers have preferences that depend on both pecuniary and nonpecu-
niary sources: income, research eﬀort itself, and the prestige resulting from
successful research. In particular, we assume the researcher’s utility in pe-
riod t is given by UF(at,b t;YFt,p t,k t),w h e r eYFt is her income and pt and
kt are the knowledge stocks at t. The assumption that utility is a function of
time spent in research is consistent with the notion that researchers who do
basic research may have a taste for it (see Stern (2004)). We take this idea
one step further by assuming that some researchers may also have a taste for
7applied research. That is, we focus on faculty who get utility from simply
working on research problems, and who view research as a “...puzzle-solving
operation in which the solution of the puzzle is its own reward” (Hagstrom
(1965, p. 16); see also Kuhn (1970)). There is substantial evidence that such
researchers also get utility from the prestige associated with the successes
of their research (see Stephan (1996) for a survey). We use the stocks of
knowledge as measures of this prestige, so that past success in either basic
or applied research generates additional current and future utility, inde-
pendently of whether it generates additional income. By not including time
spent teaching in the utility function, we merely limit our focus to faculty for
whom research provides greater utility than teaching. We make the standard
assumptions that UF(at,b t;YFt,p t,k t) has positive marginal utilities and is
strictly quasi-concave in (at,b t). It is convenient to characterize many of
the results that follow in terms of marginal rates of substitution. For any
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, is decreasing in at and increasing in bt.
As a faculty member, the researcher earns income from her university
salary and her share of the university’s license income from its patentable
knowledge. License income in each period t depends on the current stock of
patentable knowledge, Lt = L(pt).W ed e n o t et h es a l a r yi np e r i o dt by st,
and the share of license income for the researcher by φ,s oc u r r e n ti n c o m e
for a faculty researcher at t is
YFt = YF(st,φ,p t)=st + φL(pt).( 1 )
Naturally we assume that Lt(0) = 0. Notice that, because research does not
increase the stock of knowledge until the next period, current eﬀort eﬀects
future income and prestige, but not current income.
The administration maximizes his utility subject to the researcher’s par-
ticipation constraint. His utility at t is given by UA(YAt;pt,k t),w h e r eYAt
is the university’s net income. Again, we assume that UA(YAt;pt,k t) has
nonnegative marginal utilities and is strictly concave in YAt.I ne a c hp e r i o d
the university earns enrollment income, T, which depends on the quality
of education, qt. For simplicity we assume the faculty researcher or her
replacement is the only variable input, so the university’s net income is
YAt = YA(st,φ,p t,q t)=T(qt)+( 1− φ)L(pt) − st.( 2 )
8If the faculty researcher exits, we assume the university can hire a replace-
ment who can take full advantage of the stocks of scientiﬁc and patentable
knowledge. In each period, the administration chooses the time the re-
searcher spends in education (the teaching load), et, and her salary, st.
2.2 Production
In period t, the researcher’s stock of patentable knowledge is pt,a n dt h e
stock of scientiﬁck n o w l e d g ei skt. Her allocation of time between applied
and basic research in period t determines the increments to these stocks
which are realized in period t +1 . The production functions for knowledge
are therefore given by pt+1 = P(at,b t;pt,k t) and kt+1 = K(at,b t;pt,k t),
which are assumed to be increasing and jointly concave in their arguments.
The stocks of knowledge are given by the initial values (p1,k 1),a n dt h e n
pt+1 = pt+(P(at,b t;pt,k t)−pt) and kt+1 = kt+(K(at,b t;pt,k t)−kt) in sub-
sequent periods. We therefore allow for research in “Pasteur’s Quadrant,”
where a researcher’s basic research produces both patentable and scientiﬁc
knowledge, as well as the type of research characterized by Mansﬁeld in
which applied research has a positive impact on the researcher’s basic re-
search agenda (Mansﬁeld 1995 and Stokes 1997).
The production of educational quality depends on the time the researcher
spends in education as well as the stocks of knowledge that can be freely
disseminated. While the increments to scientiﬁc knowledge can be dissem-
inated freely as soon as they are realized, patentable knowledge cannot.
O n ep r o v i s i o no ft h eB a y h - D o l eA c ti st h a ti no r d e rt oc l a i mt i t l et of e d -
erally funded inventions, universities must ﬁle patent applications. Thus
patentable knowledge may not be used in education until the patent ap-
plication is ﬁled or perhaps even granted. To capture this, as well as the
tendency of companies to restrict information associated the technologies
they license, we assume the patentable knowledge that can be disseminated
in each period is θpt. We then assume that the production of educational
quality is given by qt = Q(et;θpt,k t), which we assume is increasing and
jointly concave in its arguments.
This is one way to capture the controversy surrounding Bayh-Dole and
related changes in patent policy regarding educational quality. There would
be no incentive to delay dissemination of patentable knowledge if the univer-
sity did not own the patent rights, so θ =1and educational quality would
be qt = Q(et;pt,k t). Moreover, critics have argued that this legislation can
lead to a substitution of applied research for education. This approach also
allows us to highlight the fact that there is a trade-oﬀ in educational qual-
9ity between reduced time in education and increased knowledge that results
from increased research.
In the sequel we consider a two-period problem so that we can analyze,
compare, and contrast the equilibrium outcomes in both static and dynamic
environments. An extension to more periods would add nothing new to this
analysis. The proofs of following theorems that are not included in the text
are given in the Appendix.
3 The Period-Two, Static Equilibrium
As usual, we solve for the equilibria by backward induction, starting in the
ﬁnal period. In this section, all values therefore refer to those in period two.
3.1 The Faculty Researcher’s Problem
In the second period, there is no future, so the researcher’s problem if she
remains with the university is to choose eﬀort to maximize current utility
subject to the time constraint. The time the researcher must spend in
education and the salary, as well as the knowledge stocks, and hence her
income, are given when she makes the choice of eﬀort. Substituting the
time constraint, her problem can be restated as
max
b2∈[0,1−e2]
UF(1 − e2 − b2,b 2;YF2,p 2,k 2). (3)
Keeping in mind that the “relative price” of each type of research is one,
the next result follows immediately.
Theorem 1 Let a∗
2(e2,s 2;φ,p2,k 2) and b∗
2(e2,s 2;φ,p2,k 2) solve the researcher’s
optimization problem in (3). Then the researcher specializes in basic re-
search, a∗
2 =0and b∗
2 =1− e2,i f
mab(0,1 − e2;YF2,p 2,k 2) ≤ 1, (4)
specializes in applied research, a∗
2 =1− e2 and b∗
2 =0 ,i f
mab(1 − e2,0;YF2,p 2,k 2) ≥ 1, (5)
and devotes eﬀort to each type of research, a∗
2 > 0, b∗
2 > 0,a n da∗
2 + b∗
2 =
1 − e2, if (4) and (5) do not hold, in which case
mab(a∗
2,b ∗
2;YF2,p 2,k 2)=1 . (6)
10If the marginal rate of substitution of applied for basic research is too low
(less than one) when she specializes in basic research, then that specialization
is optimal. If this marginal rate of substitution of applied for basic research
is too high (greater than one) when she specializes in applied research, then
that specialization is optimal. Otherwise, the remaining time available after
education is allocated between eﬀort in applied and basic research so that
the marginal rate of substitution between them equals one, as in (6). In this
case, the comparative statics have the expected properties.
Theorem 2 In an interior solution to (3), an increase in time spent in
education implies decreases in eﬀort in both basic and applied research. A
change in the salary, the share of license income, and either stock of knowl-
edge implies an increased allocation of eﬀort to applied research if and only
if that change increases the marginal rate of substitution of applied for basic
research.
The researcher’s indirect utility function is then
VF2(e2,s 2,φ,p 2,k 2)=UF(a∗
2,b ∗
2;s2,φ,p 2,k 2). (7)
For any given utility, v, the equation VF2(e2,s 2,φ,p 2,k 2)=v implicitly
deﬁnes an indiﬀerence curve in education-salary space for the inventor,
IF2(e2,φ,p 2,k 2,v). The properties of this indirect utility function and its
indiﬀerence curve map are crucial to understanding the administration’s
choices.
Theorem 3 The researcher’s indirect utility function is increasing in her
salary, her share of license income, and both knowledge stocks, but decreasing
in her time spent in education: ∂VF2
∂s2 > 0, ∂VF2
∂φ > 0, ∂VF2
∂k2 > 0, ∂VF2
∂p2 > 0,
and ∂VF2
∂e2 < 0. Thus, a researcher’s typical indiﬀerence curve in (e2,s 2)
space is positively sloped, and decreasing in her share of license income and
both knowledge stocks.
Each indiﬀerence curve is positively sloped because she must be paid a










the marginal rate of substitution between time in either type of research
and income. An increase in her share of license income or either knowledge
11stock shifts each indiﬀerence curve down since the utility associated with
any point in (e2,s 2) space increases.
She also has the option of exiting the university for other opportunities.
If she does, then we assume her reservation utility is ¯ UF2(φ,p2,k 2).A sn o t e d
above, unlike usual principal-agent models, her reservation utility cannot be
an exogenously determined constant. Her best external option must depend
on the stock of patentable knowledge and her share of the revenue from it,
because she does not forfeit her license income when she departs. It also
depends on the scientiﬁc knowledge stock because her external options may
depend upon the prestige associated with her stock of scientiﬁck n o w l e d g e ,
which she is free to use in any alternative employment opportunity. For any
(φ,p2,k 2) she remains in the university only if her participation constraint,
VF2(e2,s 2,φ,p 2,k 2) ≥ ¯ UF2(φ,p2,k 2), (9)
is satisﬁed.
Theorem 4 Assume there exist sL2 and sH2 such that sH2 >s L2 > 0,
VF2(0,s L2,φ,p 2,k 2)=¯ UF2(φ,p2,k 2), (10)
and
VF2(1,s H2,φ,p 2,k 2)=¯ UF2(φ,p2,k 2). (11)
Then VF2(e2,s 2,φ,p 2,k 2)=¯ UF2(φ,p2,k 2) deﬁnes a function S2(e2,φ,p 2,k 2),
where S2 maps [0,1] onto [sL2,s H2], such that the participation constraint
binds for all (e2,s 2)=( e2,S 2(e2,φ,p 2,k 2)) and:
(1) S2 is increasing in the time spent in education, ∂S2
∂e2 > 0.
(2) S2 is increasing (decreasing, constant) in the inventor’s share or either
knowledge stock if and only if the eﬀect of a change in that parameter on
her reservation utility is greater than (less than, equal to) that on her utility
within the university, or ∂S2
∂x > (<,=)0 if and only if ∂ ¯ UF2
∂x > (<,=)∂VF2
∂x for
x = φ,p2,k 2.
That is, S2(e2,φ,p 2,k 2)=IF2(e2,φ,p 2,k 2, ¯ UF2(φ,p2,k 2)) is the indiﬀer-
ence curve where the participation constraint (9) binds. The conditions in
(10) and (11), together with the results of Theorem 3, state that she will
not work for the university, even if she does not have to teach, unless she
is paid a salary of at least sL2. Similarly, she must be paid a greater salary
of at least sH2 if the university wants her to teach full time. This indif-
ference curve must be positively sloped, of course, ∂S2
∂e2 > 0.A n e x a m p l e
12is depicted in Figure 1, where her utility increases to the northwest. For
any point on S2(e2,φ,p 2,k 2), the participation constraint binds and she is
indiﬀerent between remaining in the university and exiting. For any point
above S2(e2,φ,p 2,k 2), she remains in the university because she earns rents,
VF2(e2,s 2,φ,p 2,k 2)=¯ UF2(φ,p2,k 2),b u tf o ra n yp o i n tb e l o ws h ee x i t sb e -
cause VF2(e2,s 2,φ,S 2(e2,φ,p 2,k 2)) < ¯ UF2(φ,p2,k 2).
A change in any of the parameters φ, k2,o rp2 has an uncertain eﬀect on
the location of S2(e2,φ,p 2,k 2) b e c a u s ea ni n c r e a s ei na n yo ft h e s ep a r a m e t e r s
not only increases the utility she associates with any (e2,s 2) if she remains
in the university, but also increases her reservation utility if she exits. That
is, the sign of ∂S2
∂x is given by the sign of ∂ ¯ UF2
∂x − ∂VF2
∂x for x = φ,k2,p 2.I ft h e
eﬀect on her reservation utility is greater, then S2(e2,φ,p 2,k 2) shifts up in
(e2,s 2) space. Conversely, if the eﬀect on her utility within the university is
greater (as we might expect, for example, if the knowledge is “ﬁrm-speciﬁc”),
then S2(e2,φ,p 2,k 2) shifts down in (e2,s 2) space.
3.2 The Administration’s Problem
Substituting the production relation for educational quality q2 = Q(e2;θp2,k 2)
into university net income gives YA2 = T(Q(e2;θp2,k 2))+(1−φ)L(pt)−st,
and so the administration’s utility can be expressed as a function the re-
searcher’s time in education and her salary, as well as the parameters of the
model,
VA2(e2,s 2;φ,θ,p2,k 2)) = UA(YA2(s2,φ,p 2,q 2),p 2,k 2). (12)
For a given level of utility, v, the equation VA2(e2,s 2;φ,θ,p2,k 2)=v implic-
itly deﬁnes an indiﬀerence curve in education-salary space for the adminis-
tration, IA2(e2,φ,θ,p 2,k 2,v).
Theorem 5 The administration’s utility function is increasing in the time
spent by the researcher in education and both knowledge stocks, but decreas-
ing in her salary and her share of license income: ∂VA2
∂e2 > 0, ∂VA2
∂k2 > 0,
∂VA2
∂p2 > 0,a n d∂VA2
∂θ > 0,b u t∂VA2
∂s2 < 0 and ∂VA2
∂φ < 0. Thus, an ad-
ministration’s typical indiﬀerence curve in (e2,s 2) space is positively sloped,
increasing in both knowledge stocks and the portion of patentable knowledge
disseminated, but decreasing in the researcher’s share of license income.
The administration’s indiﬀerence curve in (e2,s 2) space is also positively
sloped, so it allows the researcher to spend less time in education only if it







A change in the time she spends in education changes the quality of edu-
cation and thus tuition revenue. That is, T0(q2)
∂q2(e2;θ,p2,k2)
∂e2 is her marginal
eﬀect tuition income through educational quality, or her marginal revenue
product in education. Thus, given a decrease in her teaching load, her salary
must be decreased by an amount equal to the resulting tuition decrease to
maintain the administration at the same level of income and utility. An
increase in either knowledge stock or the portion of patentable stock dissem-
inated shifts each of its indiﬀerence curves up, since the utility associated
with any point in (e2,s 2) space increases, so it will pay more for her to carry
the same teaching load. Conversely, an increase in her share (which is a
decrease in its share) shifts each of its indiﬀerence curves down, so it will
pay less for her to carry the same teaching load.
Because its utility is increasing in the time in education and decreasing
in the salary, it follows from the preceding theorem that her participation
constraint (9) must bind if she is hired by the university. If not, then a small
increase in e2 and/or decrease in s2 will increase its utility without inducing




VA2(e2,s 2;φ,θ,p2,k 2) s.t. VF2(e2,s 2,φ,p 2,k 2)=¯ UF2(φ,p2,k 2),
(14)
or choose the point (e2,S 2(e2;φ,p2,k 2)) on her participation constraint that
maximizes its utility.
Theorem 6 If (10) and (11) hold, and if VF2(e2,s 2,φ,p 2,k 2) is strictly








∂e2 for all (φ,p2,k 2),t h e n
the solution to (15) is interior, e∗
2(φ,θ,p2,k 2) ∈ (0,1) and s∗
2(φ,θ,p2,k 2) ∈









If the indiﬀerence curves for the researcher and administration have the
correct curvature, and corner solutions at e2 =0and e2 =1are excluded,
then the solution must be interior. The assumption that its indiﬀerence
14curve at (e2,s 2)=( 0 ,s L2) is steeper than her participation constraint there
implies that its utility increases if it pays her the higher salary required to
induce her to teach. Because this implies she spends less time in research, its
utility increases only if tuition revenue increases more than the increase in
salary. As it continues to increase her salary to induce her to teach more, its
gains in net income from higher tuition revenue decline. Recalling (8),e q u i -
librium occurs when her salary and teaching load have increased to the point
that these two eﬀects oﬀset each other, so that her marginal rate of substitu-
tion between research and income is equal to her marginal revenue product
in education. This is depicted in Figure 1, where its utility increases as the
outcome moves southeast, and its indiﬀerence curves are strictly concave.
Note, however, that IA2(e2;φ,θ,p2,k 2,v) need not be concave. The second-
order suﬃcient conditions are satisﬁed as long as its indiﬀerence curve is
concave, or at least no more convex than her participation constraint.
3.3 Comparative Statics Results
Unsurprisingly, comparative statics results are diﬃcult to obtain with gen-
eral utility functions. Nevertheless, several general results are straightfor-
ward.
Theorem 7 In static equilibrium, an increase in either knowledge stock or
the researcher’s share of license income increases her utility. A decrease in
the portion of patentable knowledge disseminated has no eﬀect on her utility
but decreases the administration’s utility.
Because the researcher’s reservation utility ¯ UF2(φ,p2,k 2) is increasing in
its arguments, and she must receive at least this much utility in equilibrium,
an increase in φ, p2,o rk2 must increase her equilibrium utility (whether she
remains in the university or exits). Because the researcher’s utility within or
without the university does not depend on the fraction of patentable knowl-
edge disseminated, a change in θ has no eﬀect on her equilibrium utility.
However, the administration’s utility VA2(e2,s 2;φ,θ,p2,k 2) is increasing in
θ by Theorem 5, so a decrease in θ reduce its equilibrium utility.
Some sensible, additional assumptions on reservation utility lead to more
precise results. For example, recall that the knowledge stocks enter the re-
searcher’s preferences as measures of the prestige associated with successful
past research. Thus, for an increase in k2 to increase researcher utility more
outside the university, it would have to be the case that this increase in her
scientiﬁc knowledge stock would bring her more prestige outside the univer-
sity. A priori, this seems unlikely. If she does decide to exit this university,
15her options would typically be another university, an existing ﬁrm, or a
start-up ﬁrm. One typically thinks that the private sector values patentable
research more highly, or at least no less highly. Thus, it is reasonable to
assume that an increase in the stock of scientiﬁc knowledge from her ﬁrst
period research increases her utility from working in the university at least
as much as her utility outside, ∂VF2
∂k2 ≥ ∂ ¯ UF2
∂k2 ,s o∂S2
∂k2 ≤ 0 by Theorem 4. Sim-
ilarly, it is reasonable to assume that an increase in her stock of patentable
knowledge increases her utility outside the university at least as much as in
the university, ∂VF2
∂p2 ≤ ∂ ¯ UF2
∂p2 ,s o∂S2
∂p2 ≥ 0 by Theorem 4. Finally, because
the researcher earns her share of license income whether she works for the
university or not, a change in this share should not change her utility within
the university compared to that outside, ∂VF2
∂φ = ∂ ¯ UF2
∂φ ,s o∂S2
∂φ =0by The-
orem 4. The next result follows immediately from this and our assumption
that the quality of education is increasing in all of its arguments.
Theorem 8 In static equilibrium: (i) If the researcher’s prestige from dis-
coveries that contribute to scientiﬁc knowledge is greater within the univer-
sity, then an increase in the stock of that knowledge either decreases the
salary or increases the teaching load or both. If the prestige from patentable
knowledge is greater outside the university, then an increase in the stock of
that knowledge either increases the salary or decreases the teaching load or
both. In either case, if the teaching load does not decrease, the quality of
education increases. If it does decrease, the eﬀect on the quality of education
is ambiguous.
(ii) If her license income is the same wherever she works, then an increase
in her share either changes the salary and teaching load in same direction
or has no eﬀect on them. The quality of education decreases (increases) if
and only if the teaching load decreases (increases).
(iii) A decrease in the portion of patentable knowledge disseminated either
changes the salary and teaching load in the same direction or has no eﬀect
on them. If the teaching load does not increase, the quality of education
decreases. If it does increase, the eﬀect on the quality of education is am-
biguous.
The eﬀects on the salary and teaching load can be easily seen in Figure
1. If her prestige from basic research is greater within the university, then an
increase in k2 shifts S2(e2,φ,p 2,k 2) down, and the administration can pay
her a lower salary and/or require a higher teaching load without inducing
her to exit. Typically, we expect both a lower salary and higher teaching
load. Because the quality of education Q(e2;θp2,k 2) is increasing in k2 and
16e2, we expect a higher quality of education. The administration has an
incentive to pay a lower salary, and might pay a salary so much lower that
it must require a lower teaching load as well, in which case the eﬀect on
the quality of education is ambiguous. However, it also may pay a higher
salary in order to require an even higher teaching load and produce a higher
quality of education.
If her prestige from applied research is greater outside the university,
then an increase in p2 shifts S2(e2,φ,p 2,k 2) up, and the administration must
pay her a higher salary and/or require a lower teaching load to prevent her
from exiting. Typically, we expect a higher salary and a lower teaching load.
Because the quality of education is increasing in p2 and e2,t h ee ﬀect on the
quality of education is ambiguous. A lower salary is possible, but only if
her teaching load is also much lower. A higher teaching load is possible, in
which case the quality of education increases, but only if her salary is also
much higher.
If license income is the same inside or outside the university, then an
increase in φ shifts both indiﬀerence maps, but the participation constraint
(9) still binds at the original equilibrium point (i.e., the new participation
constraint passes through the old equilibrium point). However, because the
indiﬀerence curves through that point are associated with diﬀerent levels of
utility (her utility is higher and its is lower), their curvatures need not be
t h es a m ea st h o s eo ft h ei n d i ﬀerence curves through that point before the
change in φ. Nevertheless, because the new participation constraint must
also be positively sloped, the salary and teaching loads must move in the
same direction, if they change at all. Because the quality of education is
increasing in e2 but does not depend on φ, the quality of education is higher
if and only if the teaching load is higher. While a decrease in θ does not
aﬀect the participation constraint, it does aﬀect the quality of education
and therefore administration utility. As with a change in φ, the slopes of
the indiﬀerence curves imply that if the teaching load and salary change,
they must move in the same direction. Because the quality of education is
increasing in e2 and θ,t h ee ﬀect on the quality of education is ambiguous.
However, if the teaching load is lower, or no higher, then the quality of
education must decrease.
Finally, suppose VF2(e2,s 2,φ,p 2,k 2) and VA2(e2,s 2;φ,θ,p2,k 2) are ho-
mothetic with respect to (e2,s 2). That is, the corresponding indiﬀerence
curves IF2(e2,φ,p 2,k 2,v) and IA2(e2,φ,θ,p 2,k 2,v) h a v et h es a m es l o p ea t
any point (e2,s 2) on a negatively sloped ray emanating from the point
(e2,s 2)=( 1 ,0).T h e na ni n c r e a s ei nk2 decreases the salary and increases
the teaching load, an increase in p2 increases the salary and decreases the
17teaching load, and an increase in φ or θ has no eﬀect on the salary and
teaching load.
4 The Dynamic Equilibrium
4.1 The Faculty Researcher’s Problem
The researcher’s problem in period one, if she does not leave the university, is
to allocate time between basic and applied research to maximize the present
discounted value of her utility over both periods, subject to her period-
one time constraint and income, the knowledge production functions, and




2,φ,p 2,k 2)=¯ UF2(φ,p2,k 2), (16)
her total discounted utility over both periods is
WF(a1,b 1;s1,φ,p 1,k 1)=UF(a1,b 1,Y F1,p 1,k 1)+δ ¯ UF2(φ,p2,k 2), (17)
where a1 + b1 =1− e1, YF1 = s1 + φL(p1), p2 = P(a1,b 1;p1,k 1), k2 =
K(a1,b 1;p1,k 1),a n dδ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. We deﬁne “com-
posite” marginal utilities of WF with respect to its arguments, ∂WF
∂x for
x = a1,b 1,s 1,φ,p 1,k 1, which we assume are positive. We also deﬁne “com-






x,y = a1,b 1,s 1,φ,p 1,k 1 (x 6= y). We ﬁnally assume that WF is strictly
quasi-concave in (a1,b 1), and that the composite marginal rate of substitu-
tion of applied for basic research, Mab(a1,b 1;s,φ,p1,k 1),i sd e c r e a s i n gi na1
and increasing in b1.
Her problem, if she remains in the university in period one, is then
max
a1≥0,b1≥0
WF(a1,b 1;s1,φ,p 1,k 1) s.t. a1 + b1 =1− e1. (18)
Theorem 9 Let a∗
1(e1,s 1,φ,p 1,k 1) and b∗
1(e1,s 1,φ,p 1,k 1) solve the researcher’s
optimization problem (18). Then the researcher specializes in basic research,
a∗
1 =0and b∗
1 =1− e1,i f
∂WF(0,1 − e1;s1,φ,p 1,k 1)
∂b1
≥
∂WF(0,1 − e1;s1,φ,p 1,k 1)
∂a1
, (19)
specializes in applied research, a∗ =1− e1 and b∗ =0 ,i f
∂WF(1 − e1,0;s1,φ,p 1,k 1)
∂a1
≥
∂WF(1 − e1,0;s1,φ,p 1,k 1)
∂b1
. (20)
18and devotes eﬀort to each type of research, a∗
1 > 0, b∗
1 > 0,a n da∗
1 + b∗
1 =

















































The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (22) and (23) reﬂects the researcher’s
love for research and is a pure utility eﬀect, while the bracketed term reﬂects
the eﬀect on future utility from her current research. Producing knowledge
in period one has two eﬀects on period-two utility. One is a pure “ego”
eﬀect showing the reputational eﬀect associated with producing patentable
and scientiﬁc knowledge. The other is a “love of money” associated with her
ability to earn license income from producing patentable knowledge and to
inﬂuence her salary by producing both scientiﬁc and patentable knowledge.
Hence, in a dynamic environment, the necessary condition for an interior
equilibrium is more complex than the static condition that she allocate her
time between applied and basic research to strike a balance between her love
for each. Now she must allocate her time to strike a balance between her
love for research, her love for money, and her ego.
This result also allows us to show the complexity of the response of the
researcher to the Bayh-Dole Act and other similar policies. An increase in
φ will induce her to reallocate time from basic to applied research if and




























Because ¯ UF2 is increasing in φ, p2,a n dk2,a ni n c r e a s ei nφ does not increase
∂WF
∂a1 − ∂WF







∂b1 .N o t et h a t∂P
∂a1 > ∂P
∂b1 only if the ﬁrst hour that is reallocated
from basic to applied research results in a greater future stock of patentable
knowledge. This is likely, ap r i o r i . However, this reallocation is also likely
19to result in a lower future stock of scientiﬁck n o w l e d g e , ∂K
∂a1 < ∂K
∂b1. And, of
course, if this researcher likes basic research more, then ∂UF
∂a1 < ∂UF
∂b1 as well.
Thus, this reallocation occurs if and only if the increase in total discounted
utility from a greater future stock of patentable knowledge outweighs any
decrease from a smaller future stock of scientiﬁc knowledge and less current
time spent in basic research.
Two more points are worth noting. First, ∂P
∂a1 − ∂P
∂b1 i sl o w e rt h eg r e a t e ri s
the extent to which her research ﬁts in the so-called “Pasteur’s Quadrant,”
in which case a reallocation of time to applied research is less likely to
occur because it is less likely to increase the stock of patentable knowledge.
Second, a reallocation of time to applied research is also less likely to occur
if her love of basic research is suﬃcient that she would specialize in it absent




The comparative statics results for the interior solution are analogous to
those in the static case.
Theorem 10 In an interior solution to (18), an increase in time in ed-
ucation decreases time in both basic and applied research. A change in the
salary, the share of license income, and either initial knowledge stock implies
an increased allocation of time to applied research if and only if the composite
marginal rate of substitution of applied for basic research increases.
The researcher’s period-one indirect utility function is
VF1(e1,s 1,φ,p 1,k 1)=WF(a∗
1,b ∗
1;s1,φ,p 1,k 1), (25)
which for given utility, v, implicitly deﬁnes an indiﬀerence curve in (e1,s 1)
space, IF1(e1,φ,p 1,k 1,v), which embodies period-two equilibrium behavior
and has slope equal to the composite marginal rate of substitution between














These indiﬀerence curves, including the speciﬁc one for which the participa-
tion constraint binds, have the same properties as in the static case.
If the researcher exits the university in period one, then her total dis-
counted reservation utility from both periods is ¯ UF1(φ,p1,k 1,δ),5 which we
5We are implicitly assuming here that if she departs in period one, then the university
replaces her and so she does not have the option of returning to this university in period
two.
20assume is no less than her period-two reservation utility if she remains with
the university in period one, but then departs in period two, ¯ UF1(φ,p1,k 1,δ) ≥
¯ UF2(φ,p1,k 1). As in the static case, she remains in the university in period
one only if her participation constraint is satisﬁed,
VF1(e1,s 1,φ,p 1,k 1) ≥ ¯ UF1(φ,p1,k 1,δ). (27)
Theorem 11 In period one, the researcher’s indirect utility is increasing in
her salary, her share of license income, and both initial knowledge stocks, but
decreasing in her time spent in education in period one: ∂VF1
∂s1 > 0, ∂VF1
∂φ > 0,
∂VF1
∂p1 > 0, ∂VF1
∂k1 > 0,a n d∂VF1
∂e1 < 0. Thus, a researcher’s typical indiﬀerence
curve in (e1,s 1) space is positively sloped and decreasing in her share of
license income and both initial knowledge stocks. Furthermore, if there exist
sL1 and sH1 such that sH1 >s L1 > 0,
VF1(0,s L1,φ,p 1,k 1)=¯ UF1(φ,p1,k 1,δ) (28)
and
VF1(1,s H1,φ,p 1,k 1)=¯ UF1(φ,p1,k 1,δ). (29)
then VF1(e1,s 1,φ,p 1,k 1)=¯ UF1(φ,p1,k 1,δ) deﬁnes a function S1(e1,φ,p 1,k 1,δ),
where S1 maps [0,1] onto [sL1,s H1], such that the participation constraint
binds for all (e1,s 1)=( e1,S 1(e1,φ,p 1,k 1,δ)) and:
(i) S1 is increasing in the time spent in education, ∂S1
∂e1 > 0.
(ii) S1 is increasing (decreasing, constant) in the inventor’s share or either
initial knowledge stock if and only if the eﬀect of a change in that parameter
on her reservation utility is greater than (less than, equal to) that on her
utility within the university, ∂S1
∂x > (<,=)0 if and only if ∂ ¯ UF1
∂x > (<,=)∂VF1
∂x
for x = φ,p2,k 2.
4.2 The Administration’s Problem
The administration’s total discounted utility over both periods is





2;φ,θ,p2,k 2) is period-two equilibrium
utility and q1 = Q(e1;θp1,k 1) is substituted into its current income YA1 to
obtain current utility VA1(e1,s 1;φ,θ,p1,k 1).F o rg i v e nu t i l i t y ,v, the equa-
tion VA1(e1,s 1;φ,θ,p1,k 1)=v implicitly deﬁnes its indiﬀerence curve in
21(e1,s 1) space, IA1(e1,φ,θ,p 1,k 1,v), which embodies period-two equilibrium









Theorem 12 The administration’s total discounted utility is increasing in
the portion of patentable knowledge disseminated in education, ∂WA
∂θ > 0,
but ambiguously related to its other arguments. However, if the period-two
eﬀects of knowledge production are not perverse, then its total discounted
utility is increasing in the time spent by the researcher in education and both
initial knowledge stocks, but decreasing in her salary and her share of license
income: ∂WA
∂e1 > 0, ∂WA
∂k1 > 0,a n d∂WA
∂p1 > 0,b u t∂WA
∂s1 < 0 and ∂WA
∂φ < 0. In
this case, its indiﬀerence curve in (e1,s 1) space is positively sloped, increas-
ing in both initial knowledge stocks and the portion of patentable knowledge
disseminated, but decreasing in her share of license income.
The only general result is that its total discounted utility is increasing in
the portion of patentable knowledge disseminated in education. This does
not cause the researcher to change her allocation of time between applied and
basic research, but instead merely causes a change the quality of education
and tuition revenue. Thus, if recent legislation and policy changes reduce
the dissemination of patentable knowledge, then ceteris paribus educational
quality and administration utility decrease.
Unlike the static case, now the marginal contributions of her teaching
load and salary to its total discounted utility depend not just on their eﬀects
on its current net income, but also their eﬀects on knowledge production,
and thus its future license income and prestige. This explains the diﬃculty
in obtaining unambiguous results when the researcher’s optimal behavior is
taken into account. For example, if it increases her current teaching load,
then the direct eﬀect is to increase the current quality of education, as
∂Q
∂e1 > 0, and so its tuition revenue and utility. However, from Theorem 10,
this also decreases the time she spends in both applied and basic research,
and so the production of both types of knowledge, which in turn tends to
decrease its total discounted utility by decreasing its future tuition revenue,
licensing income, and prestige. Although it seems unlikely, or even perverse,
these “second-order” eﬀects could dominate and lower its total discounted
utility. Next, an increase in her current salary has the direct eﬀect of re-
ducing its current net income and utility, but also may induce a change in
her research behavior. This might lead her to allocate more time to basic
22research, thus increasing the production of scientiﬁc knowledge, but decreas-
ing the production of patentable knowledge and the license income from it.
Again, conceivably the latter losses could dominate.
In what follows, therefore, we assume that its total discounted utility
is increasing in the researcher’s time in education and decreasing in her
salary over the relevant range, ∂WA
∂e1 > 0 and ∂WA
∂s1 < 0 for e1 ∈ [0,1] and
s1 ∈ [sL1,s H1], so its indiﬀerence curves are also positively sloped. It then
follows from the preceding theorem that her participation constraint (27)




WA(e1,s 1;φ,θ,p1,k 1) s.t. VF1(e1,s 1,φ,p 1,k 1)=¯ UF1(φ,p1,k 1,δ),
(32)
or choose the point (e1,S 1(e1,φ,p 1,k 1,δ)) on her participation constraint
that maximizes its total discounted utility. This dynamic equilibrium out-
come is similar to that depicted in Figure 1 for the static case.
Theorem 13 Assume that (28) and (29) hold, that VF1(e1,s 1,φ,p 1,k 1)
is strictly quasi-concave in (e1,s 1),a n dt h a tWA(e1,s 1;φ,θ,p1,k 1) is in-
creasing in e1 and decreasing in s1 for e1 ∈ [0,1] and s1 ∈ [sL1,s H1].
















for all e1 ∈ [0,1]. Then the solution to (32) is interior, e∗
1(φ,θ,p1,k 1) ∈ (0,1)
and s∗









where v∗ = VA1(e∗
1,s ∗
1;φ,θ,p1,k 1).
As in the static case, the assumption that its indiﬀerence curve at e1 =0
is steeper than her participation constraint implies that its total discounted
utility increases if it pays her the higher current salary required to induce
her to teach more. Unlike the static case, however, now this reduction of
current time spent in research also reduces future knowledge stocks, license
income, and prestige. Thus, its total discounted utility increases only if the
increased teaching results in an increase in current tuition revenue that is
large enough to overwhelm these future eﬀects. Equilibrium is attained when
her salary and teaching load have increased enough that the administration’s
willingness to pay her to teach an additional hour equals her composite
marginal rate of substitution between research and income.
234.3 Comparative Statics Results
Finally, we are again interested in the period-one equilibrium teaching load
and salary, and the corresponding equilibrium total discounted utilities,
VF1(e∗
1,s ∗
1,φ,p 1,k 1) and WA(e∗
1,s ∗
1;φ,θ,p1,k 1). As in the static case, results
are diﬃcult to obtain without speciﬁc utility functions.
Theorem 14 In dynamic equilibrium, an increase in either initial knowl-
edge stock or the researcher’s share of license income increases her total
discounted utility. A decrease in the portion of patentable knowledge dis-
seminated has no eﬀect on her total discounted utility, but decreases the
administration’s total discounted utility.
As in the static case, because her total discounted reservation utility
¯ UF1(φ,p1,k 1,δ) is increasing in φ, p1,a n dk1,a ni n c r e a s ei na n yo ft h e m
must increase her equilibrium total discounted utility whether or not she
remains in the university. Because her utility inside or outside the university
does not depend on θ, a change in it has no eﬀect on her equilibrium utility.
However, by Theorem 11, a decrease in θ decreases the administration’s
equilibrium total discounted utility.
Again, given Theorem 11, reasonable assumptions on her utility lead to
more precise results.
Theorem 15 The comparative static eﬀects of changes in φ,θ,p1, and k1
on period-one equilibrium values are qualitatively the same as the results
stated in Theorem 8.
As in the static case, if her prestige from scientiﬁc knowledge is greater
within the university, then an increase in k1 allows the administration to pay
her a lower salary and/or require a higher teaching load in period-one. If her
prestige from patentable knowledge is greater outside the university, then
an increase in p1 allows it to pay her a higher salary and/or require a lower
teaching load in period-one. If license income is the same inside or outside
the university, then an increase in φ implies her salary and teaching load in
period-one must move in the same direction, if they change at all. Similarly,
a decrease in θ implies her salary and teaching load in period-one move in
the same direction, if they change at all. Finally, if VF1(e1,s 1,φ,p 1,k 1) and
WA(e1,s 1;φ,θ,p1,k 1) are homothetic with respect to (e1,s 1),t h e ni np e r i o d
one an increase in k1 decreases the salary and increases the teaching load,
an increase in p1 increases the salary and decreases the teaching load, and
an increase in φ or θ has no eﬀect on the salary and teaching load.
245C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper has sought to add rigor to the rhetoric on whether policy-makers
should be concerned about patent policy changes that created incentives for
commercialization of university research which also might be detrimental
to basic science and the quality of education. We developed a dynamic,
theoretical model in which these policy changes are equivalent to an increase
in the stock of patentable knowledge, an increase in the researcher’s share of
license income, and a decrease in the fraction of patentable knowledge that
can be used in education. One concern is that faculty might be diverted
from academic research and teaching to applied research. We showed that,
if faculty viewed both basic research and applied research as goods, then
whether these policy changes have resulted in a substitution of applied for
basic research depends on how they have inﬂuenced individual researchers’
marginal rates of substitution between these types of research and between
either type of research and income. It is therefore not obvious how these
policy changes aﬀected the allocation of time between applied and basic
research. This is an empirical question that awaits further research.
Another concern focuses on the eﬀects of these policy changes on the
quality of education. We also show that the administration chooses the
researcher’s salary and teaching load so that her marginal revenue prod-
uct in education equals her marginal rate of substitution between research
and income, and so that she earns only her reservation utility. Under our
assumptions, the eﬀects of these policy changes on the quality of educa-
tion depend on how they inﬂuence the teaching load and the amount of
patentable knowledge used in education. Generally, changes in the stock
of patentable knowledge, the researcher’s share of license income, and the
fraction of patentable knowledge that can be used in education have an am-
biguous eﬀect on the teaching load, and thus the quality of education. The
eﬀect of these policies on the amount of patentable knowledge used in educa-
tion is itself ambiguous because although the stock of patentable knowledge
increases, the fraction of it that is used in education decreases.
In the case of homothetic preferences, the comparative statics on the
teaching load are not ambiguous. An increase in the stock of patentable
knowledge has a direct eﬀect of increasing quality, but also an indirect eﬀect,
through decreasing the teaching load, of decreasing quality. A reduction in
the fraction of patentable knowledge used in education has the direct eﬀect
of decreasing quality and has no eﬀect on the teaching load. Therefore the
overall eﬀect of policy changes regarding patentable knowledge is ambiguous,
although the net eﬀect is more likely to be negative (and it deﬁnitely is if the
25amount of patentable knowledge used in education does not increase enough
to oﬀset the negative eﬀects of a decreased teaching load). Finally, in this
case an increase in the researcher’s share of license income has no eﬀect on
quality because it has no eﬀect on the teaching load.
There remain unexplored issues of interest. For example, if eﬀort in
education is unobservable, then there is a moral hazard problem which the
administration must deal with in designing the researcher’s contract. A
more detailed analysis of the researcher’s outside options might also be of
interest, particularly because universities are increasingly allowing faculty
to take sabbaticals to develop their inventions in start-up ventures. In the
latter case, administrations must be careful in designing contracts that take
into account potential conﬂicts of interest and commitment.
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7 . 1 P r o o f so fT h e o r e m s1 ,2 ,3 ,a n d4
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To prove Theorem 2, recall a∗
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for x = e2,φ,p 2,k 2.
If there exists a sL2 > 0 such that VF2(0,s L2;φ,p2,k 2)=¯ UF2(φ,p2,k 2),
then because ∂VF2
∂s2 > 0 > ∂VF2
∂e2 by Theorem 3, there exists a unique sH2 >
sL2 such that VF2(1,s H2;φ,p2,k 2)=¯ UF(φ,p2,k 2). It then follows from
the implicit function theorem that there exists an s2 = S2(e2;φ,p2,k 2)
such that VF2(S2(e2;φ,p2,k 2),e 2;φ,p2,k 2)=¯ UF2(φ,p2,k 2) where, for given
(φ,p2,k 2), S2 maps [0,1] onto [sL2,s H2] and is increasing in e2.S t a n -








































7.2 Proofs of Theorems 5 and 6
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Hence, given any IF, such as the one associated with the participation con-
straint, the problem of choosing an (e∗
2,s ∗
2) on that IF2 to maximize VA2
is equivalent to choosing the (e∗
2,s ∗
2) on that IF2 associated with the “high-
est” (most southeast) IA2. Thus, because the researcher’s indiﬀerence curves
are increasing and strictly convex, while the administration’s indiﬀerence
curves are increasing and strictly concave, this is given by the tangency









∂e2 for all (φ,θ,p2,k 2,v) guarantee that
30this tangency must be at an e∗
2 ∈ [0,1]. That the solution also satisﬁes
s∗
2 ∈ [s20,s 21] then follows from Theorem 4.
7.3 Proofs of Theorem 9, 10, and 11
If NF1(b1;s1,φ,p 1,k 1)=WF(1 − e1 − b1,b 1;s1,φ,p 1,k 1), then the proof of
Theorem 9 is entirely analogous to that of Theorem 1, with NF1 replacing
NF2, WF replacing UF,a n dt =1replacing t =2 . Similarly, the comparative
statics results in Theorem 10 are proved in the same way as those in Theorem
2 with the addition that Mab replaces mab.









∂x =0for x = s1,φ,p 1,k 1 at an interior solution to
show that ∂VF1
∂x = ∂WF
























∂a1 . The results for indirect
utility follow from the assumptions on the composite marginal utilities, and








for x = e1,φ,p 1,k 1.
If there exists a sL1 > 0 such that VF1(0,s L1;φ,p1,k 1)=¯ UF1(φ,p1,k 1,δ),
then because ∂VF1
∂s1 > 0 > ∂VF1
∂e1 from above, there exists a unique sH1 >s L1
such that VF1(1,s H1;φ,p1,k 1)=¯ UF1(φ,p1,k 1,δ). It then follows from the
implicit function theorem that there exists an s = S1(e1;φ,p1,k 1) such
that VF1(e1,S 1(e1;φ,p1,k 1);φ,p1,k 1)=¯ UF1(φ,p1,k 1,δ) where, for given
(φ,p1,k 1,δ), S1 maps [0,1] onto [sL1,s H1] and is increasing in e1. Standard







































, which proves statements
(i) and (ii) of Theorem 11.
7.4 Proofs of Theorems 12 and 13






























































































31To solve (32), form the Lagrangian £(e1,s 1,λ)=WA(e1,s 1;φ,θ,p1,k 1)+
λ[WF(e1,s 1,φ,p 1,k 1) − ¯ UF1(φ,p1,k 1,δ)]. Using ordinary techniques, the











and WF(e1,s 1,φ,p 1,k 1)=¯ UF1(φ,p1,k 1,δ). The former implies ∂IA1
∂e1 =
∂IF1
∂e1 , which with the participation constraint proves (33). Again using stan-
dard techniques, the second order suﬃcient condition for a constrained max-



























∂e1 )2 ≥ 0. Substituting for λ from the ﬁrst or-
der conditions, using the participationc o n s t r a i n t ,a n dr e a r r a n g i n gt e r m s ,







] ≥ 0. Because ∂WA
∂s1 < 0,






. Thus, because the researcher’s indiﬀer-
ence curves are increasing and strictly convex, this condition merely re-
quires the administration’s (increasing) indiﬀerence curves to be less con-








∂e1 for all (φ,θ,p1,k 1,δ,v) guarantee that this
tangency must be at an e∗
1 ∈ (0,1). That the solution also satisﬁes s∗
1 =
S1(e∗
1,φ,p 1,k 1,δ) ∈ (sL1,s H1) then follows from Theorem 11.
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